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Abstract
Theory and evidence are ambiguous about the eect of within-rm wage inequality
on rm performance. This paper tests empirically this relationship drawing on detailed
Brazilian matched employer-employee panel data, considering alternative measures of in-
equality and performance and dierent estimation methods. We nd overwhelming evi-
dence of a positive relationship between wage dispersion and rm performance when using
cross-section analysis, especially in manufacturing. However, this relationship is weakened
when controlling for rm time-invariant heterogeneity.
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11 Introduction
Firms face important choices when designing incentives for workers, namely in terms of pay
structures. To the extent that (perceptions of) `fairness' is an important issue from the
workers' point of view, large dierences in pay levels for workers of similar characteristics
may be detrimental for rm performance (Akerlo & Yellen 1988, 1990). On the other hand,
workers' eort may be particularly sensitive to the potential of earning higher wages - as in
`tournaments' (Lazear & Rosen 1981) - in which case the relationship between pay inequality
and rm performance will be positive.
This question, also posed in the title of our paper, has been examined empirically in
several occasions with contrasting results. On the one hand, several studies present evidence
supporting the `tournaments' views (Main et al. 1993, Winter-Ebmer & Zweimuller 1999,
Eriksson 1999, Hibbs & Locking 2000, Lallemand et al. 2004, Heyman 2005, Lallemand et al.
2007). On the other hand, there are also some studies supporting the `fairness' view , although
their number is smaller (DeBrock et al. 2001, Martins forthcoming).1
Our contribution to this empirical literature is two-fold. First, we draw on detailed
matched employer-employee panel data. The potential gain in insight from this type of data
sets is obvious, as one can build much better measures of worker and rm heterogeneity. As
far as we know, only Martins (forthcoming) has used similar data sets before in this context;
and few papers consider conditional measures of inequality, in which worker characteristics are
partialed out from wages (Winter-Ebmer & Zweimuller 1999, Heyman 2005, Lallemand et al.
2007, Martins forthcoming). Second, we provide evidence for developing countries, which so
far have been completely overlooked in this literature. However, in many respects the analysis
of these countries - Brazil, in our case - is of particular interest, as the institutional settings
there may allow for greater 
exibility in human resource management, including pay setting,
and therefore facilitate experimentation in terms of dierent HRM approaches.
In our analysis, we match three dierent data sets (RAIS, a matched employer-employee
panel data set; PIA, a survey of manufacturing sector rms; and PAS, a similar survey for
service sector rms), over the period 1998-2001. As far as we know, this is one of the rst
papers that considers both the manufacturing and the services sectors. We also consider
alternative measures of within-rm inequality and of rm performance (prots and added
1Leonard (1990) does not establish any signicant relationship. See Lallemand et al. (2007) also for a very
detailed survey of the literature.
2value per worker). Moreover, for the benet of robustness, we employ a large set of dierent
econometric models: OLS, quantile regression, instrumental variables, xed eects and both
xed eects and instrumental variables.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the data, some
descriptive statistics and the measures of inequality used. Sections 3 and 4 present the results.
Finally, Section 5 concludes.
2 Data
As mentioned above, we use the following data sets: RAIS, a matched employer-employee
panel data set; PIA, a survey of manufacturing sector rms; and PAS, a similar survey for
service sector rms. RAIS (`Rela c~ ao Anual de Informa c~ oes Sociais', Annual Social Data
Report), is a census of all rms and all their formal-sector employees in Brazil conducted by
the Ministry of Labour. The data include detailed information about each employee (wages,
hours worked, education, age, tenure, gender, worker nationality, etc) and each rm (industry,
region, size, establishment type, etc) in each year, plus a unique identier for each employee,
each establishment and each rm.2
PIA (`Pesquisa Industrial Anual', Annual Manufacturing Survey) and PAS (`Pesquisa An-
ual dos Servicos', Annual Services Survey) are yearly establishment surveys covering the
entire country, conducted by IBGE (Brazilian Statistics Agency). They cover all establish-
ments (census) with 30 or more workers (20 or more in the case of PAS), plus a random
sample of establishments whose size ranges from 5 to 29 workers (5 to 19 in the case of PAS).
Moreover, the surveys collect information on labour inputs, labour costs, turnover, production
level and other variables.
PAS is ongoing since 1998 while PIA, at least in its current format, is ongoing since 1996.
Here, we examine the 1998-2001 period3 and consider a sample comprising a balanced panel
of 7,689 rms, of which 4,990 are in the manufacturing sector and 2,699 in the services sector.
The sample was constructed so that every rm selected has data for at least 50 employees in
each year. As will be explained later, this restriction is imposed to allow sucient degrees
of freedom in the estimation of rm-year wage regressions. Moreover, in order to address
outliers, we also restrict the sample to rms whose prots lie on the central 95% of the prots
2See Appendix D for more details on RAIS. See also Martins & Esteves (2006) for a recent application.
3All nominal variables are de
ated by the Brazilian consumer price index (INPC).
3per worker distribution every year throughout the study period.
The RAIS data is used twice: rst, worker-level information is drawn to compute a con-
ditional measure of inequality based on the residuals of wage regressions; second, the means
of the human capital variables per rm are used in rm performance regressions. The rst
stage above involves individual information for nearly 1,300,000 workers-year (approximately
740,000 from the manufacturing sector and approximately 560,000 from the service sector).
The list of variables used in the second stage of regressions, i.e., in the rm performance
regressions, is shown in Table 9. Tables 1, 10 and 11 show the descriptive statistics of these
variables for the whole set of rms, for the set of manufacturing rms and for the set of service
rms, respectively.4
2.1 Inequality measures
We use two main types of measures of wage dispersion, namely, conditional and unconditional.
Unconditional measures, which do not contemplate worker heterogeneity in terms of the ob-
served characteristics of human capital (educational level, gender, job tenure, experience, and
age), are considered in three dierent ways: the standard deviation of wages of rm j in year
t; the coecient of variation of rm j in year t; and the ratio between the minimum and
maximum wage observed at rm j in year t.5
In order to take into account the extent of wage dispersion across homogeneous workers
(the conditional measure), we use the standard error of a wage regression (), as in Winter-
Ebmer & Zweimuller (1999). In this case, the analysis is performed in two stages, the rst
consisting in estimating a wage regression for each rm-year, according to the following simple
specication:
ln wi = X0
i + i; (1)
where lnwi is the logarithm of the hourly wage of individual i; and Xi is a vector of variables
capturing at least some of the attributes of worker i (educational level, gender, job tenure and
4Some ndings follow from the analysis of Tables 1, 10 and 11: service rms employ on average more
workers than do manufacturing rms; except for 1998, the prots per worker in manufacturing rms were
higher than those in service rms; prot dispersion in the manufacturing sector was larger than in the service
sector; manufacturing rms were more unequal than those in the service sector; most measures of inequality
- described below - increased considerably over the period; manufacturing and services present similar means
for education and female participation; workers in the manufacturing sector are younger, but their tenure is
longer.
5An obvious limitation of unconditional measures of inequality is that worker heterogeneity in a given rm
will imply wage dispersion that is not related to any incentive policy.
4age). After estimating the regression for each rm-year, the conditional measure of inequality









where j represents the standard error of wage regression for rm j; d ln wi is the estimated
value of the logarithm of the hourly wage of individual i; n is the number of observations in
the rm (and year); and k is the number of parameters to be estimated.
The second stage considers the role of wage dispersion variables (either conditional or
unconditional) as rm performance determinants. Unlike in wage regressions of the rst stage
(at the worker level), performance regressions include information about the human capital
of the workforce aggregated at the rm level, i.e., the means of human capital variables per
rm.
3 Cross-Sectional Analysis
This section describes the results of performance regressions. As mentioned in the intro-
duction, we consider here three dierent estimations methods: OLS, quantile regression and
instrumental variables.
3.1 OLS
The econometric model follows the functional specication in Lallemand et al. (2004) and is
as follows:
ln(P=n)j = Mzj + X0
j + F0
j' + j; (3)
where the dependent variable is the logarithm of prot (or added value) per worker at rm
j; Mzj is the measure of inequality or wage dispersion z of rm j, in which z corresponds to
either sigma, the standard deviation, the coecient of variation or the max-min ratio; X is
the vector of variables that capture characteristics of the workers employed at rm j; and F
is the vector of variables that capture characteristics of rm j.
Cross-sectional regressions were obtained for each year and for each one of the four wage
dispersion measures, thus totaling 16 dierent regressions. The results are presented in Table
52, where we nd that all coecients of the wage dispersion measures have a positive sign.
Moreover, only in the cases of the sigma and max-min ratio in 1998, or for the sigma, coecient
of variation and maxmin ratio in 1999 are the results not signicant.
However, one issue with the functional specication above is that when using the logarithm
of prots per worker as the dependent variable, the sample is restricted to rms with positive
prots. This implies a loss of a large number of annual observations. An alternative approach
is the use of the logarithm of value added as the dependent variable (Lallemand et al. 2007).
We follow this alternative approach and obtain cross-sectional analysis for each year and for
each one of the four wage dispersion measures, using now as dependent variable the logarithm
of the added value per worker. Similarly to the previous analysis, all 16 coecients have a
positive sign, but now all are statistically signicant at the 1% level - see Table 3.6
Tables 4 and 5 show the results of the cross-sectional regressions separately for the man-
ufacturing and services sectors, respectively. All coecients have a positive sign and are
signicant at the 1% signicance level. Except for the coecient of the maxmin variable for
1998, all other coecients are higher for the manufacturing sector than for the service sector.
Overall, the evidence above suggests a positive relationship between within-rm wage
dispersion and economic performance for Brazilian rms. It also suggests that incentives
generated by wage inequality are more eective in the case of manufacturing rms.
The second piece of evidence seems to corroborate the argument by Milgrom (1988) and
Milgrom & Roberts (1990). The idea is that white-collar workers (more common work in the
services sector) may withhold information from managers in order to increase their in
uence
(e.g. to get a promotion) and to engage in rent seeking activities instead of productive work. A
related view (Lazear 1989, 1995) is that service rms have a larger number of non-cooperative
workers (`hawks') compared to the manufacturing sector, who would have a larger number
of cooperative workers (`doves'). In both cases, some wage compression will be desirable for
these workers.
The results presented so far indicate strong evidence in favor of the hypothesis of a positive
relationship between within-rm wage dispersion and economic performance for the Brazilian
case. This evidence is corroborated by unconditional measures and also by the sigma condi-
6By comparing the results in Tables 2 and 3, the specication with the logarithm of the added value (Table
3) improves the statistical signicance of the tests and also prevents the large loss of observations comparatively
to the results in Table 2 (approximately 2,400 observations of rms per year). The next subsections use only
the specications with the logarithm of the added value per worker as dependent variable.
6tional measure of inequality.7 However, note that the results obtained from OLS estimators
may be biased. The next sections will deal with these problems by considering alternative
econometric methods.
3.2 Quantile Regression
OLS estimates are based on the mean conditional distribution of the dependent variable.
This approach implicitly assumes that the possible dierences in the impact of exogenous
variables across the conditional distribution of the dependent variable are negligible. In other
words, if the exogenous variables exert some in
uence on other parameters of the conditional
distribution of the dependent variable than the mean, an OLS approach will be misleading.
The aim of this section is to assess the relationship between wage inequality and rm per-
formance using quantile regression (Koenker & Bassett (1978); see Martins & Pereira (2004)
for an application. Dierently from OLS, quantile regression characterizes the conditional
distribution of the dependent variable, rather than assuming that the impact of the exoge-
nous variables is the same along the distribution of the dependent variable. We believe this
analysis can be particularly insightful in our context as it will highlight dierences across
rms of dierent eciency levels.
In our context of rm performance equations, the quantile regression model can be dened
as:
ln(P=n)j = Z0
j + uj; (4)
Quant[ln(P=n)jjXj] = X0
j; (5)
where Zj is a vector of exogenous variables (which include Mj, Xj and Fj) and  is a
vector of parameters. Quant[ln(P=n)jjZj] denotes the th conditional quantile of ln(P=n)
given Z. In this paper, we present the coecients obtained for the 10th, 25th, 50th, 75th and
90th percentiles (dubbed P10, P25, P50, P75 and P90, respectively).
Tables 6, 12 and 13 show the results of quantile regressions for all rms, for manufacturing
rms and for rms in the service sector, respectively. All coecients have a positive sign and,
in most cases, are statistically signicant. Some cases of insignicant coecients were found
in regressions concerning the 10th percentile of the conditional distribution (P10).
7As previously mentioned, the sigma measure is preferable to any other measure as far as the purpose of
this study is concerned. The next sections will only consider specications based on sigma.
7Overall, the quantile regression results suggest that the coecients of the relationship be-
tween wage inequality and rm performance increase with conditional performance. This nd-
ing strengthens earlier evidence of a positive relationship between inequality and performance.
Moreover, as with OLS estimates, quantile regression estimates reveal higher coecients for
manufacturing rms compared to services rms.
3.3 Instrumental Variables
An important potential source of bias in OLS is simultaneity or reverse causality. For instance,
under rent sharing, rms may increase their wage dispersion if high-wage workers have more
bargaining power than low-wage workers. In this case, exogenous shocks that increased prots
would lead to increases in wage inequality - which could be mistakenly interpreted as a positive
impact of wage inequality upon rm performance.
In order to address this problem, this subsection presents results obtained through 2SLS
estimates, as specied in the following equations:




t' + jt (6)
Mzjt = $1Mzj(t 1) + $2Mzj(t 2) + ln(P=n)jt + X0
jt + Fj
0
t + jt (7)
Similarly to Heyman (2005), lagged wage dispersion measures are used here as instrumental
variables (IV). In our case, the rst and second lags (t 1 and t 2) of Mzj were used as IV.
The rationale for this choice is that lagged values of inequality will be (positively) correlated
with their current values; and it can be assumed that current performance is driven only by
current values of inequality (thus meeting the exclusion restriction).
Table 7 shows the value-added coecients for 2000 and 2001 (the second stage of the 2SLS
regression - equation
All coecients of the sigma variable in Table 7 have positive and statistically signicant
values, regardless of the sectors or years sampled. This can be regarded as strong evidence in
favor of the hypothesis of a positive impact of within-rm wage dispersion upon performance.
Moreover, these results again point to higher coecients for manufacturing compared to
services.
84 Longitudinal Analysis
The previous sections showed that the cross-sectional analysis supports the tournament theory
for the Brazilian case. This section conducts a longitudinal analysis, by estimating both pooled
regressions and xed-eect regressions.
4.1 Pooled Regressions
Here we pool the annual observations of rms (1998-2001) as in cross-sectional time series
data and provide results that serve as a benchmark for the xed-eects results.8 The rst
specication corresponds to the pooled OLS regression:
ln(P=n)jt = Mzjt + X0
jt + F0
jt' + t + jt; (8)
where t is a set of dummies for each year.
As with cross-sectional analyses, we consider separately all rms, manufacturing rms
only and services rms only. The results for the coecients with pooled OLS regressions are
shown on the rst line of Table 8. All coecients are positive and signicant at the 1% level.
Moreover, the coecient for the sample of manufacturing rms (1.23) is nearly twice that of
the coecient obtained for the sample of service rms (0.64).
The second specication is that of the quantile regression with pooled data, as shown in
the following equation:
ln(P=n)j = Z0
j + tj + uj (9)
As in previous analysis, the quantile regression coecients were obtained for the 10th,
25th, 50th, 75th and 90th percentiles. The results for the coecients obtained with the spec-
ication above are shown in Table 8, lines 2 (P10) through 6 (P90). Again, all coecients are
positive and signicant at the 1% level and the coecient values increase at higher percentiles,
independently of the sector.
The third specication is that of the pooled 2SLS regression, as shown in the following
equations, in which, as before, lagged wage dispersion measures are used as instrumental
8The standard errors of the coecients obtained from the pooled regressions are corrected for clusters, i.e.,
repeated observations for the same rm.
9variables (IV):
ln(P=n)jt = Mzjt + X0
jt + F0
jt' + t + jt (10)
Mzjt = $1Mzj(t 1) + $2Mzj(t 2) + ln(P=n)jt + X0
jt + F0
jt + t + jt (11)
The results for the coecients obtained from the pooled 2SLS specication are shown in
Table 8, line 7. All the coecients are positive and signicant at 1%, regardless of the sector.
Again, the coecients obtained from the 2SLS regression yielded higher values than those
obtained from the OLS estimates. 2SLS values are twice as high as those of OLS (2.63 vs.
1.23 in case of manufacturing rms, 1.45 vs. 0.64 in case of service rms and 2.32 vs. 1.08 for
the whole set of rms).
4.2 Fixed Eects
A source of bias in econometric estimates that has not been addressed yet in this paper
concerns unobserved heterogeneity. This section deals with this problem by using xed eects.
(Hausman's specication test was used for choosing between the random-eect and xed-eect
models, rejecting the former.) The aim here is to control for the unobserved and time-invariant
heterogeneity of rms, which we do by estimating the following model:
ln(P=n)jt = Mzjt + X0
jt + F0
jt' + t +  j + jt; (12)
where  j are the rm xed eects.
The results for the coecient obtained from the specication of this model are displayed
in Table 8, line 8. The samples of all rms and of the manufacturing rms yielded positive
coecient values (0.05 and 0.09, respectively). On the other hand, rms in the service sector
had a negative coecient value (-0.007). However, no coecient was statistically signicant.
The results above may need to be viewed with caution, since there are two issues that may
aect the xed-eect estimates: First, the panel is relatively short, with a time span of only
four years, which may hinder the estimation of xed eects. Secondly, even if the unobserved
and time-invariant heterogeneity of rms is controlled for, the endogeneity problem between
wage inequality and performance remains unsolved.
The solution to the rst problem mentioned above implies the inclusion of further time
periods in the sample. The solution to the second problem implies xed-eect estimates with
10instrumental variables. Given our constraints in terms of extending the length of our sample,
we consider the case of instrumental variables only.
The econometric specications of the xed-eect model with instrumental variables are:
ln(P=n)jt = Mzjt + X0
jt + F0
jt' + t +  j + jt; (13)
Mzjt = $1Mzj(t 1) + $2Mzj(t 2) + ln(P=n)jt + X0
jt + F0
jt + t +  j + jt: (14)
The results for the coecients obtained from this model are shown in Table 8, last line.
Unlike xed-eect estimates without addressing endogeneity, here all coecients yielded pos-
itive values. However, only the coecient for the service sector was signicant.
5 Conclusions
This paper studies the relationship between within-rm wage dispersion and performance
for a large set of Brazilian rms both from the manufacturing and services sectors. Our es-
timates are obtained from dierent within-rm wage dispersion measures (conditional and
unconditional inequality), dierent sectors of economic activity (industry and services), dif-
ferent performance measures (prot per worker and added value per worker), dierent sample
characteristics (cross-sectional and longitudinal designs) and dierent econometric estimators
(OLS, quantile regression, 2SLS, xed eects and xed eects with instrumental variables).
While most econometric analysis yields positive and statistically signicant coecients,
xed eects did not. However, the latter results may need to be interpreted with caution, as
our panel is relatively short.
An additional aim of this study was to obtain results so as to assess the con
icting theories
in this literature (tournament and fairness) for the case of Brazil. No results that could
conrm the fairness hypothesis were obtained in any of the specications or subsamples used,
i.e., there was no negative and statistically signicant correlation between wage dispersion
and rm performance.
Finally, two sets of results deserve special attention: First, the quantile regression results
lend further support to the result of a positive impact of wage inequality on rm performance.
Second, overall, the results suggest that incentives generated by wage inequality are more
eective in the case of manufacturing rms. According to Lazear (1989, 1995) and others, the
11weaker eect of inequality on the performance of service rms may be driven by a larger share
of non-cooperative workers (`hawks') in this sector compared to the case of manufacturing.
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13Table 1: Descriptive Statistics, All Firms
Mean (Standard Deviation)
1998 1999 2000 2001
Variables
Ln Employment 5,07 5.10 5.16 5.18
(0.91) (0.91) (0.91) (0.93)
Prots pw 934 1,022 1,051 926
(3,000) (3,079) (3,017) (2,984)
Value Added pw 16,007 15,909 16,198 16,019
(14,305) (14,722) (14,813) (14,923)
Sigma 0.16 0.15 0.15 0.15
(0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.10)
Standard Deviation 2.17 2.08 2.09 2.22
(2.20) (3.36) (2.89) (2.65)
Coef. of Variation 75.91 75.30 76.05 79.69
(39.74) (41.09) (40.39) (47.07)
Maxmin 37.01 38.04 38.76 45.48
(92.33) (82.50) (57.45) (70.64)
Tenure 36.41 39.44 40.76 42.84
(21.84) (22.61) (22.61) (23.52)
Schooling 6.67 6.87 7.07 7.25
(1.77) (1.74) (1.76) (1.77)
Age 32.43 32.76 32.88 33.17
(3.75) (3.75) (3.79) (3.81)
Fem 0.27 0.27 0.27 0.27
(0.24) (0.23) (0.23) (0.24)
Obs. 7689 7689 7689 7689
Notes: (1) Monetary values in R$ at 1998 prices (INPC de
ator).
A Main tables
14Table 2: Cross Section Analysis, OLS - All Firms
Dependent Variable: Ln Prots pw
1998 1999 2000 2001
Regressors



















Observaes 5218 5287 5297 5200
Notes: (1) Signicant at 1% (***), 5 % (**), and 10% (*); (2) Ro-
bust standard errors in parenthesis; (3) Each cell corresponds a dierent
regression; (4) Regression also include the following control variables:
ln employment, schooling, tenure, % female, dummies for location and
sector; (5) Monetary values in R$ at 1998 prices (INPC de
ator).
Table 3: Cross Section Analysis, OLS - All Firms
Dependent Variable: Ln Value Added pw
1998 1999 2000 2001
Regressors
























Obs. 7635 7630 7621 7626
Notes: (1) Signicant at 1% (***), 5 % (**), and 10% (*); (2) Robust stan-
dard errors in parenthesis; (3) Each cell corresponds a dierent regression;
(4) Regression also include the following control variables: ln employment,
schooling, tenure, % female, dummies for location and sector; (5) Monetary
values in R$ at 1998 prices (INPC de
ator).
15Table 4: Cross Section Analysis, OLS - Manufacturing Firms
Dependent Variable: Ln Value Added pw
1998 1999 2000 2001
Regressors
























Obs. 4940 4944 4935 4944
Notes: (1) Signicant at 1% (***), 5 % (**), and 10% (*); (2) Robust stan-
dard errors in parenthesis; (3) Each cell corresponds a dierent regression;
(4) Regression also include the following control variables: ln employment,
schooling, tenure, % female, dummies for location and sector; (5) Monetary
values in R$ at 1998 prices (INPC de
ator).
Table 5: Cross Section Analysis, OLS - Services Firms
Dependent Variable: Ln Value Added pw
1998 1999 2000 2001
Regressors
























Obs. 2695 2686 2683 2681
Notes: (1) Signicant at 1% (***), 5 % (**), and 10% (*); (2) Robust stan-
dard errors in parenthesis; (3) Each cell corresponds a dierent regression;
(4) Regression also include the following control variables: ln employment,
schooling, tenure, % female, dummies for location and sector; (5) Monetary
values in R$ at 1998 prices (INPC de
ator).
16Table 6: Cross Section Analysis, Quantile Regressions - All Firms
Dependent Variable: Ln Value Added pw
P10 P25 P50 P75 P90 N
Sigma
1998 0,85 1,03 1,16 1,15 1,19 7633
(2,53) (1,37) (0,96) (0,33)
 (1,53)






2000 0,75 0,90 1,29 1,45 1,49 7614
(9,01) (2,62) (1,50) (0,97) (3,16)






Notes: (1) Signicant at 1% (***), 5 % (**), and 10% (*); (2) Robust stan-
dard errors in parenthesis; (3) Each cell corresponds a dierent regression;
(4) Regression also include the following control variables: ln employment,
schooling, tenure, % female, dummies for location and sector; (5) Monetary
values in R$ at 1998 prices (INPC de
ator).
Table 7: Cross Section Analysis, 2SLS
Dependent Variable: Ln Value Added pwt
Manufacturing Manufacturing Services Services All Firms All Firms
2000 2001 2000 2001 2000 2001
Second Stage


























(a) 2,00 0,45 0,19 5,13 1,64 2,01
(0,15) (0,50) (0,66) (0,02) (0,20) (0,15)
Shea R
2Partial 0,32 0,26 0,32 0,23 0,33 0,26
Notes: (1) Signicant at 1% (***), 5 % (**), and 10% (*); (2) Robust standard errors in
parenthesis; (3) Each cell corresponds a dierent regression; (4) Regression also include the
following control variables: ln employment, schooling, tenure, % female, dummies for loca-
tion and sector; (5) Monetary values in R$ at 1998 prices (INPC de
ator); (a) P-Valor in
parenthesis.
17Table 8: Longitudinal Analysis
Dependent Variable: Ln VA pwt
Manufacturing Services All Firms



































Fixed Eects 0,09 -0,007 0,05
(0,12) (0,04) (0,08)
IV - Fixed Eects 0,35 0,24 0,31
(0,43) (0,16)
 (0,30)
Notes: (1) Signicant at 1% (***), 5 % (**), and 10%
(*); (2) Cluster standard errors in parenthesis; (3) Each
cell corresponds a dierent regression; (4) Regression
also include the following control variables: ln employ-
ment, schooling, tenure, % female, dummies for loca-
tion, sector, and year; (5) Monetary values in R$ at
1998 prices (INPC de
ator).
18Table 9: List of Variables
Description:
Variables
Ln Employment Log of employees - proxy for rm size
Prots pw Prots per worker by rm in R$, 1998 prices
Value Added pw Value Added per worker by rm in R$, 1998 prices
Ln Prot Log of Prots pw
Ln Value Added Log of Value Added pw
Sigma Standard Error of Wage Regression by Firm-Year
Standard Deviation Standard Deviation of Wages by Firm-Year
Coef. Variation Wages Coecient of Variation by Firm-Year
Maxmin Maximum-Minimun Wages Ratio by Firm-Year
Tenure Tenure in months - Firm-Year Average
Schooling Years of Schooling - Firm-Year Average
Age Age of Workers - Firm-Year Average
Fem Female participation in % by Firm-Year
Location Dummies for 27 Brazilian States
Sector Dummies for sectors 3-digit CNAE
B Additional tables
19Table 10: Descriptive Statistics, Manufacturing Firms
Mean (Standard Deviation)
1998 1999 2000 2001
Varibles
Ln Employment 4.94 4.97 5.02 5.03
(0.82) (0.81) (0.82) (0.83)
Prots pw 836 1,049 1,103 952
(3,392) (3,511) (3,437) (3,420)
Value Added pw 19,060 19,102 19,583 19,453
(16,386) (16,908) (16,911) (17,103)
Sigma 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.16
(0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.10)
Standard Deviation 2.34 2.27 2.28 2.40
(2.34) (3.93) (3.36) (2.95)
Coef. of Variation 80.05 79.45 80.17 83.24
(40.44) (40.33) (38.97) (45.87)
Maxmin 37.19 36.85 37.46 43.69
(108.03) (90.64) (52.96) (70.24)
Tenure 40.23 43.03 44.00 46.69
(21.60) (22.26) (22.30) (22.82)
Schooling 6.63 6.85 7.07 7.24
(1.67) (1.64) (1.67) (1.70)
Age 31.80 32.10 32.18 32.50
(3.46) (3.44) (3.43) (3.46)
Fem 0.28 0.28 0.28 0.28
(0.24) (0.24) (0.23) (0.24)
Obs. 4990 4990 4990 4990
Notes: (1) Monetary values in R$ at 1998 prices (INPC de
ator).
20Table 11: Descriptive Statistics, Services Firms
Mean (Standard Deviation)
1998 1999 2000 2001
Variables
Ln Employment 5.31 5.35 5.42 5.46
(1.03) (1.02) (1.02) (1.04)
Prots pw 1.114.52 971.80 954.80 879.64
(2,080.11) (2,053.32) (2,021.02) (1,931.38)
Value Added pw 10,563 10,005 9,941 9,669
(6,302) (5,935) (6,009) (5,614)
Sigma 0.15 0.14 0.14 0.15
(0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09)
Standard Deviation 1.84 1.73 1.75 1.90
(1.87) (1.87) (1.67) (1.95)
Coef. Variation 68.30 67.61 68.45 73.12
(37.23) (41.38) (41.85) (48.56)
Maxmin 36.68 40.24 41.18 48.79
(52.40) (64.78 (64.88) (71.28)
Tenure 29.40 32.81 34.78 36.62
(20.50) (21.75) (22.61) (23.53)
Schooling 6.73 6.92 7.09 7.27
(1.94) (1.92) (1.92) (1.90)
Age 33.60 34.00 34.17 34.40
(3.97) (4.00) (4.07) (4.11)
Fem 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.26
(0.23) (0.23) (0.23) (0.25)
Obs. 2699 2699 2699 2699
Notes: (1) Monetary values in R$ at 1998 prices (INPC de
ator).
Table 12: Cross Section Analysis, Quantile Regressions - Manufacturing Firms
Dependent Variable: Ln Value Added pw
P10 P25 P50 P75 P90 N
Sigma


























Notes: (1) Signicant at 1% (***), 5 % (**), and 10% (*); (2) Robust stan-
dard errors in parenthesis; (3) Each cell corresponds a dierent regression;
(4) Regression also include the following control variables: ln employment,
schooling, tenure, % female, dummies for location and sector; (5) Monetary
values in R$ at 1998 prices (INPC de
ator).
21Table 13: Cross Section Analysis, Quantile Regressions - Services Firms
Dependent Variable: Ln Value Added pw
P10 P25 P50 P75 P90 N
Sigma


























Notes: (1) Signicant at 1% (***), 5 % (**), and 10% (*); (2) Robust stan-
dard errors in parenthesis; (3) Each cell corresponds a dierent regression;
(4) Regression also include the following control variables: ln employment,
schooling, tenure, % female, dummies for location and sector; (5) Monetary
values in R$ at 1998 prices (INPC de
ator).
C Theory
Akerlo & Yellen (1988) presents an eciency wage model where, due to imperfect monitoring
and imperfect measurement of worker heterogeneity, the problem of the rm lies in managing
incentives in order to elicit more eort from workers. In this study, the authors suggest that
the workers' eort function can be expressed as:
e = e(2(w)); (15)
where e is the eort, w is the wage and 2 is the within-rm wage dierential. The expression
above suggests that workers' eort does not depend solely on wages, but also on within-
rm wage dispersion. In this case, higher wages and lower within-rm wage dispersion allow
employers to demand more eort from their workers.
The idea of a tradeo between wage dispersion and rm performance originating from a
feeling of fairness is elaborated in Akerlo & Yellen (1990), where they assume that workers








where w is the wage earned by the worker, wf is the wage level considered to be fair and 1
is the normal eort level. The equation above shows that workers' eort falls short of the
wage they regard as fair. The idea of a fair wage, as previously mentioned, is based on the
comparison of wage dierentials within and outside rms.
A second theoretical argument that supports a negative relationship between within-rm
relative wage dispersion and economic performance is developed in Milgrom (1988) and Mil-
grom & Roberts (1990). The authors argue that white-collar workers have incentives to
withhold information from managers in order to increase their in
uence and to engage in
rent-seeking activities instead of productive work. The authors also state that the implemen-
22tation of some degree of wage equity can reduce the tendency of white-collar workers to take
personal interest decisions instead of decisions that may be protable for the organization as
a whole.
On the other hand, Lazear & Rosen (1981) points to the benets of a more dispersed
wage structure derived from a performance-based pay system, in which the most productive
workers are awarded the largest prize; therefore, a higher eort is demanded from workers
so that they remain in contention for the prize (bonuses or promotions). This idea can be
expressed as follows: consider two identical risk-neutral workers, j and k, and a risk-neutral
rm with a compensation scheme in the value of Wh for the most productive workers and of
Wl for the least productive ones, where Wh > Wl. The output level of each player is given
according to the following equation:
qi = ei + i; (17)
where q is the output level, e is the eort level, i = [j;k] and  is a random component of
output (e.g.: luck). Let us now suppose that the utility expected from player j is given by
the following equation:
Uj = P (Wh   C(ej)) + (1   P)(Wl   C(ej)); (18)
where U is the expected utility, P is the probability to win the game, and C(.) is a cost
function with C0 > 0 and C00 > 0. The probability of player j winning the game is:
prob(qj > qi) = prob((k   j) < (ej   ek)) = prob((ej   ek) > ) = G(ej   ek); (19)
where  = (k   j),  distributed in g () with mean zero, and G is the cumulative density
function of . The worker maximizes his expected utility, U, by choosing an eort level in








If both players, j and k, maximize their utilities, the marginal probability to win relative




@ G(ej   ek)
@ ej
= g (ej   ek): (21)
Substituting the equation above into the rst-order condition for the maximization of the
expected utility yields:




Given the hypothesis of homogeneous work, both players will choose the same eort level.
According to the symmetric Nash equilibrium ej = ek, and the outcome of the game is random
with P = 0:5. Thus, the latter equation can be written as:




The equation above indicates that a higher wage dispersion deriving from output-based reward
strategies, (Wh   Wl), implies larger marginal costs of eort for players, or simply higher levels
of eort, since C0 > 0 e C00 > 0, as previously stated.
Lazear (1989, 1995) also argue that the eciency of an output-based compensation system
can be oset (or even neutralized) by the eect of a lower level of work cohesion due to non-
23cooperative behaviors. They show that high wage compression is crucial for an organization
in which most workers are non-cooperative (hawks). According to these authors, following
the arguments of Milgrom (1988) and Milgrom & Roberts (1990), hawks are commonly found
among management and supervision sta members and among white-collar workers.
D RAIS
RAIS (`Rela c~ ao Anual de Informa c~ oes Sociais', Annual Social Information Report) is an ad-
ministrative report led by all tax registered Brazilian establishments. Since the information
may be used for investigation about labor legislation compliance, rms that do not comply
with it do not le in RAIS. Thus, this data set can be considered a census of the formal
Brazilian labor market (State-owned enterprises, public administration and non-prot orga-
nizations are also required to le the report.) Firms that do not provide accurate information
will be committing an oense sanctioned by law, a threat that is likely to lead to very high
standards of data quality.
RAIS covers the whole country and is carried out annually. The information is collected
every year in the rst quarter, referring to the previous year. Every tax registered enterprise
receives a unique tax number (CNPJ). This number is composed by a specic rm part and
a complement for each unit (local plant or establishment) that the rm operates.
The main variables available from the survey at the establishment level are:
 Geographic location: State, metropolitan region, county;
 Activity sector: CNAE (National Economic Activity Classication); sector Level (10
categories); activity (42 categories); sub-activity (about 560 categories);
 Establishment Size: number of workers, number of wage earners, number of owners;
 Establishment Type: Private enterprise, private foundation, State-owned enterprise,
State foundation, joint public-private enterprise, non-governmental organization, gov-
ernment, nonprot enterprise, notary.
At the employee level, the following information is available (although we did not obtain
access to all variables listed):
 Occupation: occupation classes (CBO-Brazilian Occupation Classication system - about
350 categories); subgroup (84 categories); group (11 categories);
 Personal Characteristics: schooling (9 classes), age, gender, nationality.
 Contract Information: month of admission, month of separation, December wage rate
(13th monthly salary), average yearly wage, tenure, separation cause (red with/without
fair reason, separation with/without fair reason, retiring, transfer to other units or
rm), contract type (work card, civil service, isolated worker, temporary worker), con-
tract status (in activity or paid leave, leave without paid, occupation accident, military
service, maternity leave, sick leave, inactive), admission type (rst placement in rm,
re-employment, transferred), contract hours (exclusive overtime).
As some other matched employer-employee panels, RAIS is based on worker spells, dened
by an occupation-establishment-contract group in each year. In other words, if a worker
changes his/her occupation or establishment or contract type in a given year, there will be
one separate observation for each case.
With the establishment identication number (CNPJ) it is possible to follow all establish-
ments that le the RAIS survey. Moreover, with the worker's national insurance number, it is
24possible to follow all workers that remain in the formal sector and to match the worker's char-
acteristics with those of the establishment. Therefore, we can create a panel that matches
workers to their establishments and follow each of them over time. It was using the rm
identication numbers that we have merged the three data sets described in this appendix.
25